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INCREASING EFFORTS IN SSMA: 
WHAT DOES IT TAKE?
by Ursign Hofmann, Samuel Paunila [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ], 
and Katherine Prizeman [ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs1 ]
FEATURE
T
he inadequate management of conventional ammu-
nition results in negative consequences such as di-
version to illicit groups and unplanned explosions 
at munitions sites (UEMS). Both diversion and unintended 
blasts can result in a severe humanitarian impact, undermine 
development efforts, compromise defense capabilities, and 
lead to instability.
In recognition of this recurring danger, political, normative, 
and operational efforts have increased to promote the safe and 
secure management of ammunition (SSMA). As the issue en-
joys greater national, regional, and international attention, 
stakeholders should simultaneously take stock of achieve-
ments, consider if current efforts address the challenges at 
hand, and appreciate what further steps are needed to achieve 
greater success. 
This article builds on a Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) study depicting the cur-
rent state of SSMA.2 It reviews recent normative developments 
and identifies capacity and implementation gaps for further 
consideration by relevant stakeholders. 
Better Safe Than Sorry: The Case for SSMA
Ammunition is usually stored in a legal, state-owned stock-
pile. Unfortunately, diversion from state-owned stockpiles is 
not uncommon. Such diversion risks fueling regional pro-
liferation as recently evidenced in Libya, Southeast Europe, 
Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire, and is increasingly understood as a 
major threat to peace and security.3,4 
Diverted conventional ammunition can be leveraged by non-
state actors, including terrorist groups. Ammunition diver-
sion and use by such third parties is widespread, including 
as energetic material for improvised explosive devices (IED). 
Considering the manufacture of IEDs, large-caliber ammuni-
tion such as artillery shells and mortar bombs are particularly 
dangerous due to their substantial high-explosive content and 
casings designed to spray quantities of lethal fragments over 
a wide area. 
Poorly-managed ammunition also poses a safety threat—a 
development experienced by half of the world’s countries in 
the last forty years.5 In 2017, at least one major incident in-
volving a UEMS was reported every month.6 In light of the 
sensitivities surrounding ammunition management and the 
reputational concerns of states, the actual number of inci-
dents may be significantly higher than reported. 
When ammunition depots are located in urban areas, explo-
sions can have an even greater humanitarian impact, further 
resulting in considerable socio-economic, environmental, 
and financial repercussions. The implications for national 
defense capabilities are also apparent. A sudden loss of ser-
viceable ammunition may reduce the state’s ability to defend 
national territory, and the armed forces may attempt to resup-
ply with an urgent procurement for an often-significant cost. 
Conversely, preventing incidents is known to cost a fraction of 
repairing the damage and replenishing stock. Beyond finan-
cial considerations, regaining trust with affected communi-
ties is also a formidable task.7
To address the risks of diversion and unintended explosions, 
SSMA is growing as a political, normative, and operational 
priority. What are the key recent developments related to am-
munition safety and security, and what are their implications 
for the future direction of SSMA?
Expanding Normative Framework 
In the early 2000s, poor ammunition-management prac-
tices became obvious. In response, and after a recommenda-
tion by a Panel of Governmental Experts in 2008, the United 
Nations created a set of International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG) in 2011. The IATG are meant to offer prac-
tical, coherent, authoritative, step-by-step advice for those who 
wish to improve the safety and security of ammunition storage 
sites. Simultaneously, the U.N. SaferGuard Programme was es-
tablished, which provides the United Nations with knowledge 
management to oversee and disseminate the IATG. Both were 
welcomed in the U.N. General Assembly by resolution 66/42. 
With universal acceptance of the IATG, a clear and coherent 
reference point is now available for national ammunition man-
agement regulations and relevant regional initiatives, as well as 
state- and non-state-led SSMA programs.8
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Since ammunition was initially addressed under U.N. guid-
ance in a 1997 report of a Panel of Governmental Experts 
on Small Arms, a patchwork of international and regional 
instruments—particularly well developed on the African 
continent—now address ammunition.9,10 Most instruments 
have approached ammunition through specific reference to 
small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). Adopted in 2013, the 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the latest addition to this frame-
work through its prohibitions and export assessment crite-
ria, which apply to ammunition utilized in weapons covered 
by the ATT’s scope. This includes all major categories of con-
ventional weapons as well as SA/LW. In exporting ammuni-
tion, adequate stockpile management is key to mitigating the 
risk of diversion. Stockpile management also features areas for 
The terrifying scale of the blast of an arms warehouse that sparked a mass evacuation of 20,000 people in Balakleya, Ukraine, 
March 2017.
Images courtesy of YouTube/Oleksii Tamrazov.
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treaty-related international cooperation and assistance.11 It re-
mains to be seen how ATT States Parties will concretely share 
good practices and report on effective measures taken to ad-
dress the diversion of transferred ammunition.12 
Current frameworks, which sometimes differ in their defini-
tion of ammunition, pose challenges to their effective and co-
herent implementation.13 More systematic scrutiny on how to 
bring regional regimes closer to global frameworks is also war-
ranted. A positive example of this is the call by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Ministerial 
Council in 2017 to explore the possibility of voluntary use of 
the IATG in relevant OSCE assistance projects.14
Toward More Coherent Political Action
In parallel to normative developments, several political pro-
cesses on ammunition management have taken shape within 
and outside of the United Nations. 
Since 2015 and through its SSMA initiative, Switzerland 
has stimulated open and inclusive discussions among policy- 
practitioners and technical experts on ammunition management 
implementation challenges and responses.15 By doing so, the Swiss 
initiative has contributed to setting the stage and focusing politi-
cal attention to an issue that has historically been sensitive and 
sometimes difficult to address in multilateral settings. 
The General Assembly has addressed “problems arising from 
the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in 
surplus” since 2004 when it first decided to include this topic 
as a stand-alone agenda item.16 The resolution has been gener-
ally adopted on a biennial basis with the latest iteration from 
2017.17 In this context of heightened political momentum on 
SSMA, the latest version established a multilateral platform 
for discussions. Coordinated by Germany, the lead sponsor, 
the resolution mandated to identify urgent issues on which 
progress can be made in the area of conventional ammuni-
tion. These informal discussions are intended to inform the 
work of a Group of Governmental Experts, which will be con-
vened by the U.N. Secretary-General in 2020.18 In parallel, 
the African Union (A.U.) adopted its regional Ammunition 
Safety and Security Management initiative in 2017 in support 
of the A.U.’s vision of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020. 
Importantly, the scope of discussions in international and re-
gional fora appears to be expanding from surplus ammunition 
to address broader issues related to the safety and security of 
ammunition management. This development is positive as the 
risks of diversion and explosions are best addressed through 
a comprehensive, whole-life-cycle approach to ammunition 
management. Proper management of all conventional ammu-
nition, including but not limited to surplus stocks, is necessary.
A good example of an ammunition depot: ammunition warehouse ASP 7 (Ammunition Supply Point 7), Italy.
Image courtesy of Dino Fracchia/Alamy Stock Photo.
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Deliberate efforts are now needed to ensure that the vari-
ous political initiatives do not duplicate one another. The 
U.N. General Assembly track has thus far prompted substan-
tive exchanges on trends in diversion and on the provision 
of technical assistance and capacity building, thereby clari-
fying current gaps and possible remedial actions concerning 
ammunition safety and security. Concurrently, the rather re-
gional and more ‘operational’ SSMA initiatives of Switzerland 
and the A.U. could be harnessed to complement and enhance 
the General Assembly platform. 
Seeing Big: From Providing Security to Broader 
SSMA Dividends
Historically, policymakers have perceived ammunition man-
agement as a highly technical activity involving only armed 
forces and state security preparedness. This perspective has, 
however, started to encompass the bigger picture, including 
the community safety and environmental contamination as-
pects of ammunition management, as well as to recognize 
the complementary role and capabilities of non-military per-
sonnel and organizations. Indeed, SSMA can demonstrate 
considerable dividends in view of broader peace and securi-
ty efforts and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(see Figure 1, next page). The Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG) provide a framework to systematically articulate the 
many dividends of ammunition management. 
Improving stockpile management and data collection capac-
ities is key to curbing illicit arms flows and helps to prevent 
unplanned explosions, enabling at-risk countries to better 
protect civilians; increase urban safety for all groups of soci-
ety such as the safety of housing, basic services, and education 
facilities; and provide a safe and secure work place for am-
munition storage guards. The SDGs can also serve as a vehi-
cle for strengthening national institutions in charge of SSMA 
and promoting their effectiveness, accountability, and trans-
parency, as well as for more consistent participation of wom-
en in decision-making. Finally, the international cooperation 
and assistance in SSMA contributes to reducing inequalities 
among countries, supporting those in greatest need.19 The U.N. 
General Assembly has called on states to consider ammuni-
tion management as part of their national efforts to achieve 
the SDGs and to consider the development of ammunition- 
related national indicators.20
Similarly, by reducing the risk of diversion, SSMA can be un-
derstood as a means to sustain peace and represents a tangi-
ble contribution to the U.N. Secretary-General’s new agenda 
for disarmament. “Securing Our Common Future,” the newly 
-minted disarmament agenda, argues that poorly-managed 
stockpiles of conventional arms and ammunition constitute 
humanitarian hazards and pose threats to peace and secu-
rity. The Secretary-General acknowledges that proper physi-
cal security and stockpile management supports and sustains 
An example of an exposed, insecure, and potentially unsafe stockpile of ammunition in Kosovo.
Image courtesy of PCM ERW Risk Management and MAT Kosovo LLC.
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development efforts and is an important component of how 
disarmament saves lives.21
At a time when many donors consider their political and 
financial support as concrete investments, implementing part-
ners are called upon to demonstrate tangible impacts. Whether 
or not these investments are perceived to pay off may deter-
mine future funding trends and modalities. To date, SSMA 
has largely remained reliant on output-based measurements 
(e.g., the number of munitions destroyed or storage areas 
refurbished).22 Approaching SSMA as an element of wider 
frameworks, such as normative (treaties, IATG), development 
(SDGs), governance (security sector reform), or peace and 
security, and embracing a longer-term, broad perspective for 
support, could help identify and better demonstrate the long-
term impact and effectiveness of SSMA projects. 
From Ad Hoc to Investing in Sustainable Change
Years of practice in the SSMA domain have shown that im-
mediate, short-term interventions can be essential in prevent-
ing a disaster from materializing and saving lives. However, 
experience has also illustrated that a comprehensive, gradual 
approach to institutional, legislative, and operational changes 
BROADER POLICY LANDSCAPE OF AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
Counter-terrorism
Arms embargoes
Disarmament,
demobilization and 
reintegration
Sustaining peace
Prevention 
of diversion
and proliferation
Prevention of
unplanned explosions
at munitions sites
SAFE AND SECURE AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
Sustainable development
FIGURE 1
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
NORMS AND STANDARDS
© GICHD 2018
Security sector governance
Figure 1. Broader policy landscape of SSMA.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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in ammunition management is necessary to attain sustain-
able solutions.23 Supported by international and regional good 
practice, expertise, and guidelines, international assistance 
has taken place through direct engagement with national au-
thorities. Investing in lasting change should logically drive 
international assistance. For example, ammunition plan-
ning should entail its entire life cycle: all technical, financial, 
and normative aspects concerning its safe arrival in a stock-
pile, security of stocks, sheltered and cool storage locations, 
inspections and maintenance protocols, trained personnel, 
transport, use, and final disposal. Whole-of-life assistance 
should become the norm rather than the exception.
National ownership has not always been sufficiently prior-
itized in international assistance frameworks. In the area of 
ammunition management, assistance has sometimes lacked 
adequate national responsibility and accountability. This, 
compounded by a persisting lack of awareness of the risks as-
sociated with the consequences of inadequate ammunition 
management practices, has hampered progress in SSMA. A 
mix of tailored incentives must be offered more convincingly 
to increase appreciation of these risks and foster understand-
ing of the breadth of measures an appropriate response entails. 
As opposed to focusing only on the Ministry of Defence and 
relevant departments of the armed forces, greater awareness is 
Figure 2. GICHD Ammunition Safety Management tool set—step 2F: how to rehabilitate an existing ammunition storage area.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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required across state institutions on the accountability of the 
state for ammunition management. Sensitizing and involv-
ing oversight bodies such as parliaments could be considered 
to that effect. Moreover, national commitment may need to 
be nurtured from the top all the way down to the keeper of 
a local ammunition store. To do so effectively, trust building 
over time is essential and presupposes a long-term partner-
ship with international stakeholders. 
Effective and well-coordinated national structures are evi-
dence that ammunition management is nationally owned. 
Yet the reality is that structures often lack adequate author-
ity, skills, and resources if they exist at all (e.g., national SA/
LW commissions). The establishment, equipment, and em-
powerment of national institutions should thus be given in-
creased attention, which includes the development of skills 
and knowledge specific to stakeholder groups at all levels. 
Equally important is to anchor a clear division of labor and 
responsibilities between national and interna-
tional partners in national action plans and/
or roadmaps. 
As important as such documents are in acti-
vating national ownership, they may not suc-
ceed without concurrent competent guidance 
and capacity development. This is particularly 
true for identifying and establishing context- 
specific, needs-based national priorities. 
Failing to do so presents the risk of open- 
ended, ineffective international assistance. 
In this vein, the development of a nation-
al normative and technical framework that 
draws on the IATG is crucial for sound im-
plementation and the sustainability of SSMA. 
Certain national norms might often be in 
place, but these are generally spread over disci-
plines associated with fire safety, construction 
standards, inventory controls, and transport 
and storage of hazardous materials. They are 
rarely considered together as one entity to ad-
dress the full scope of SSMA. Additionally, na-
tional principles of ammunition management 
may not always reflect the latest normative or 
technological developments. There may also 
be challenges related to oversight and enforce-
ment. Therefore, familiarity with the IATG 
should be increased at an early stage in those 
contexts where national regulations are in-
complete or not yet established.
Matching Needs With Resources
In the last decade, countries that are considered at risk 
have increasingly benefitted from international assistance. 
Assistance has been provided through multiple channels and 
by an array of governments and other actors, sometimes re-
sulting in duplication of efforts, lack of coordination, and 
ensuing inefficiencies. The various coordination mecha-
nisms have largely not kept up with the speed at which sup-
port has grown. This is compounded by the difficulty to fully 
grasp the magnitude, modalities, and destinations of assis-
tance globally; mapping the available technical expertise in 
this field, taking into consideration regional and language 
needs, and then matching it with the needs at a national lev-
el. Furthermore, many governments may not yet be fully fa-
miliar with the IATG as an international baseline for good 
practice. This knowledge gap risks thwarting a wider donor 
GICHD Ammunition Safety Management training, Switzerland, 2015.
Image courtesy of GICHD.
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involvement in SSMA and continues to impinge on the effec-
tiveness of matching resources, needs, and expertise. The con-
duct of the comprehensive survey of assistance provided and 
expertise available, the review of national reports submitted 
pursuant to the U.N. Programme of Action on the illicit trade 
in SA/LW and requests for assistance contained therein, and 
the fostering of knowledge and use of existing good-practice 
tools under the U.N. Saferguard Programme could help tran-
scend that gap.
Accelerated IATG rollout, establishment of national regula-
tory and strategic frameworks, and enhanced international 
cooperation may not sound particularly revolutionary as pos-
sible solutions; however, they remain essential components of 
effective and sustainable SSMA efforts. There is significant po-
tential to promote more structured in-country coordination 
to overcome the often-fragmented responses, with the nation-
al counterpart in the driving seat. Similarly, where strong re-
gional leadership is in place, regional mechanisms should be 
strengthened to better respond to and act on requests, includ-
ing by developing and availing local training capacities. The 
A.U.-Germany coordination platform for the Greater Sahel is 
a useful example in this regard. At the international level, an 
effective multilateral forum for donor coordination could also 
be beneficial. 
Conclusion
SSMA is becoming a key consideration of the internation-
al community at various levels, from the normative to the 
technical. International support has stepped up to strength-
en national efforts. These are highly positive developments 
in recent years. However, major bottlenecks persist, particu-
larly in view of more effective and sustainable SSMA. Greater 
awareness around the risks stemming from inadequate am-
munition management should be a priority, along with 
communicating available expertise and instilling nation-
al responsibility in risk-mitigation measures. Additionally, 
more efforts are needed to move away from ad hoc and short-
term responses toward sustained efforts in building nation-
al capacities, designing laws, standards and roadmaps, and 
seeking systemic improvements. In parallel, international 
cooperation and assistance must be coordinated and allocat-
ed more effectively. 
The GICHD and the United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs (UNODA) have deepened their collaboration and con-
tinue to work to address these gaps jointly with their partners, 
in line with the spirit of partnership called for by the U.N. 
Secretary-General’s new Disarmament Agenda.24 
In particular, the GICHD and UNODA collaborate closely 
on operationalizing the U.N. Saferguard Programme, from es-
tablishing a truly global roster of expertise to the further up-
dating of the guidelines and making them more accessible. In 
light of the challenges ahead, many SSMA stakeholders, from 
donor and at-risk countries to implementing partners, are re-
solved to scale up their engagement. Deepening commitment 
and expanding activities are promising developments toward 
the safe and secure management of ammunition. 
See endnotes page 61
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